

SUMMARY OF THE 2002 AUMF

The 2002 Authorisation for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)—the full text of which is [available here](#)—cited as reasons for granting President Bush the authority to use force against the Saddam Husayn regime its past crimes, ongoing threats, and potential future dangers:

1. Saddam had abolished the existence of a neighbouring state (Kuwait)
2. Saddam continued to violate the terms of the ceasefire from 1991
3. Saddam got far closer to a nuclear weapon than was suspected in 1991
4. Saddam kept stockpiles of chemical WMD and a “large scale” biological WMD program at least into the mid-1990s
5. Saddam inhibited the international WMD inspection regime, eventually leading to the expulsion of the inspectors
6. Saddam continued a campaign of concealment around the WMD programs and was in “material breach” of the U.N. resolutions governing this
7. Enforce the Iraq Liberation Act, in which “Congress concluded that Iraq’s continuing weapons of mass destruction *programs* threatened vital United States interests and international peace and security” [italics added]
8. Saddam’s continued threats to Iraq’s neighbours
9. Saddam’s continued “brutal repression of [Iraq’s] civilian population[,] thereby threatening international peace”
10. Saddam’s refusal to settle the accounts over Kuwait—key terms of the ceasefire—by making restitution for property that was damaged or stolen, and returning non-Iraqi prisoners of war, including 600 “disappeared” Kuwaitis and one American serviceman [Michael Scott Speicher]
11. A demonstrated willingness to use WMDs, against neighbouring states and Iraq’s population
12. Saddam’s “continuing hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the United States”, for example by trying to assassinate George H.W. Bush and firing on the planes enforcing the no-fly zones that protected the Kurds and Shi’is
13. Sheltering members of Al-Qaeda
14. Continuing to “aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations”
15. The danger that Saddam will give WMDs to terrorists his regime supports or harbours in Iraq to use in attacks on the U.S. or her allies
16. Saddam’s refusal to comply with the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, specifically 660, 678, 687, 688, and 949, which govern the terms of the ceasefire, the demands for dismantling the WMD infrastructure, and the safety of Iraq’s neighbours, which have been threatened again since the 1991 ceasefire.
 - Legally, the AUMF cast itself as an enforcement of UNSCR 678—which reaffirmed eleven other Resolutions: 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677—calling for the use of force to reverse Saddam’s annexation of Kuwait, and the AUMF also cited itself as living up to UNSCRs 686 (the formal ceasefire resolution) and 687 (which set the terms under that called off the troops at the Iraqi border, terms Saddam violated every day)
17. Enforcing the provisions of the Iraq Liberation Act that called for “the United States to support efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime”
18. The War on Terrorism cannot succeed while Iraq remains in the hands of a regime that pursues a policy of “ongoing support for international terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of mass destruction”
19. The post-9/11 AUMF made clear that all states and organisations that support or harbour the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks will be dealt with in the same way as the Taliban-Qaeda regime, and Saddam has allowed Al-Qaeda operatives shelter in Iraq
20. Peace and security in the Gulf region—a key interest of the U.S.—cannot be achieved while Saddam remains in power