By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 13 January 2018

The Islamic State’s (IS) tactical behaviour, particularly its attitude toward the holding of territory, has become a centrally important matter recently with the destruction of the “caliphate” and IS’s reversion to insurgency.

This issue has been a consistent interest of this blog. In June 2016, as IS was retreating from Sirte, its “capital” in Libya, I wrote about IS’s history of ceding urban areas when faced with overwhelming odds and regrouping in the rural belts. The speeches of Hamid al-Zawi (Abu Umar al-Baghdadi), the first proto-caliph of the IS movement, and his explanation of the need to put politics and doctrine over geography have been a continuing source of fascination (see here, here, and here). And the final speech of Taha Falaha (Abu Muhammad al-Adnani), IS’s spokesman, in May 2016, plus the commentary in Al-Naba, IS’s weekly newsletter, around the same time fit squarely in the ideological-military lineage set out by al-Zawi.

Al-Naba has been an important source of information on IS’s thinking as its statelet has been shrunk and now eliminated. It was in Al-Naba in October that IS officially announced its return to insurgency and terrorism. Before that Al-Naba had explained how IS was waging its war in Raqqa—and how its enemies were waging their war. Since that time, it is in Al-Naba that IS has used to mock those who are writing off the group this time, just as they did last time, and to claim that the switch to insurgent-terrorist activity is working.

On 21 December, in CTC Sentinel, Hassan Hassan wrote about this transition from statehood to insurgency and highlighted a number of articles from Al-Naba where IS has documented and explained this. It seemed worthwhile to give more extensive summaries of these. In due course they will be reproduced below.

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In Al-Naba 43, 16 August 2016, there was an article on page 3—where IS often has its most important editorial—entitled, “And Sit in Ambush at Every Place”. The article noted that IS did not view the holding of territory as the measure of victory and that the group was already engaged in a wide-scale insurgency. Al-Naba lauded the insurgent methods IS had adopted, and celebrated the advances IS was making as it gained experience:

A day does not pass when people don’t hear reports of large-scale operations carried out by the soldiers of the caliphate in areas beyond their control, even when they have aligned against them under the pressure of bombing and destruction, or were previously inaccessible. …

The apostates of all kinds, and their crusader masters behind them, make many mistakes by thinking that the removal of the Islamic State from a region by aerial bombardment, or an incident of treachery and betrayal, will make them despair of returning to it, or accept the survival of the infidels [who come in to occupy the territory] in safety and reassurance. And they are thus exposing their ignorance of the doctrine carried forth by the soldiers of the Islamic State, and the approach they are taking in their jihad. It is one of the foundations of tawhid (monotheism), established [as a governing system] by the soldiers of the caliphate—bi fadl Allah (by the grace of God)—that they do not stop fighting the mushrikeen (polytheists, idolaters) until they convert them to the religion of God …

The evidence of history proves that the mujahideen of the Islamic State did not allow the apostates to enjoy security and safety for even a day, and their sabila (path) was, in the words of the Lord, “Fight them! God will torment them at your hands, and He will disgrace them and give you victory over them, and He will heal the breasts of the believing people” [At-Tawbah (Repentance) (9): 14]. This is evident from the years after the emergence of the Sahwat in Iraq, when the mujahideen inhiyaz ila al-sahra (turned/departed into the desert), leaving behind dozens of mujahideen, the soldiers of al-mafariz al-amniya (the security detachments), who harassed the apostates, killing and slaughtering them, confusing them, depleting their ranks, and exhausting their army, police, and intelligence forces until God authorized the return of al-Fursan al-Sahra (the Knights of the Desert) to storm the apostates’ fortresses, after they had become weary from the [attacks with] al-aswad al-kawatim (the black silencers) of the guns, bombs, and the martyrdom operations, and this is what will continue—God willing—until God separates [the believers] from criminal people everywhere. …

The joy of the Rafida (Shi’is, Iranians) and the apostates of the Sahwat in Iraq because of the loss of territory by the Islamic State, and the joy of the Sahwat and the Kurds in Syria, is without consideration of their predecessors; they have not learned their lessons, or listened to advice the caliphal state to repent and return to God …

The war of al-mafariz al-amniya against the apostates is still in its infancy, but not a day passes by where the mujahideen do not gain experience in methods of deceiving their enemies, thwarting their security plans, and overcoming the limits and obstacles they set in the path of the mujahideen to protect themselves from their blows. The blows also strike a long way away in Paris and Brussels. … If [supporters of IS] are unable to reach the Dar al-Islam (The Abode of Islam), it is decided that they should wage the jihad against the mushrikeen and apostates in Dar al-Kufr (The Abode of Unbelief).

The apostates of the Sahwa factions in Syria should review themselves, return to their religion, … and realiz[e] that their leaders—and the Arab and non-Arab tyrants behind them—are unable to protect them from the blows of the mujahideen. … They must know that they can only protect themselves by declaring repentance to God, to gain safety from torment in this world and the Hereafter. …

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Al-Naba 53, released on 3 November 2016, page 3, “Ghazwat al-Rutba (The Battle of Rutba): How the City was Opened in Hours”.

Rutba is a strategically important town in Anbar province in western Iraq—IS has it within Wilaya al-Anbar—sitting equidistant (about 175 miles) from the provincial capital of Ramadi in the east and the border town of Al-Bukamal to the north.

The IS movement has always had Syria as strategic depth, able to take shelter under the protection of Bashar al-Asad’s regime, and to receive assistance from Syrian intelligence in feeding suicide bombers into Iraq during the years of the American regency. In the caliphate era, Rutba was overrun by IS on 21 June 2014, and declared “completely liberated” by the Iraqi security forces on 19 May 2016.

For the Iraqi government, Rutba is a key gateway to Jordan, as Al-Naba notes, with the highway from Baghdad via the border crossing of Trebil to Amman running through Rutba. The Trebil border-crossing is “one of the three most important economic outlets” for Iraq, Al-Naba adds.

IS launched a diversionary attack on Rutba in October 2016, about a week after the U.S.-led Coalition offensive to retake Mosul, the Iraqi “capital” of IS, had begun, and it is this attack to which Al-Naba 53 devotes itself. Citing a “private military source”, Al-Naba says that under pressure from the “surprise” attack by the jihadists “the rejectionist army and the Awakening of apostasy” (al-jaysh al-rafidi wal-sahwat al-rida) collapsed.

“The battle began on Sunday morning [23 October]”, says Al-Naba, “launched after planning, with the tasks divided among mujahideen groups … The city was stormed from three axes. … The number of mujahideen on each axis ranges from twenty to thirty.” Al-Naba concedes that there were “fierce clashes” with the security forces and the Awakening militias, but it was over quickly: “After only four hours, the storming/raiding groups (majmu’at al-aqataham) broke through the defensive lines of the apostates and overran all the fortifications they had put up around the city, including the four dirt berms (suwatr turabiya). They then took control of all the barracks and killed everyone in them.”

IS describes the way its forces swarmed Rutba with small teams coming at the security forces from all angles. The jihadists “liberated fifteen people from the ‘anti-terrorism’ prison” during the attack, says Al-Naba. When the dust settled, IS had killed and wounded one-hundred security forces and Awakening militiamen, according to Al-Naba. “The most notable person to be killed was an Awakening commander from Albu-Issa tribe [from within the Dulaym], killed by a bomb from an agent inside the city.” Eight humvees, plus various other vehicles and stacks of weapons and ammunition, were captured by IS, Al-Naba says.

“The operation to control Rutba showed the brittle/fragile (al-hash) internal situation of the areas from which the Islamic State has withdrawn, and the ability of the caliphate soldiers to easily recapture them with a few small groups of mujahideen”, says Al-Naba. IS had begun softening up Rutba “months before”, Al-Naba went on, “with the mujahideen launching from the Wilayats of Al-Anbar and the Euphrates (Al-Furat) a series of military operations and rapid/lightning strikes (al-amaliyat al-askariya wal-hajamat al-khatafa) on the bases of the rejectionist army and the Awakening around the city, and on the military convoys along the Amman-Baghdad international road, with entire convoys annihilated (ubeedat) on more than one occasion, causing great attrition/depletion in the [ranks of] the apostates, killing hundreds of their number and destroying dozens of their vehicles, which disrupted the military presence of the rejectionists in the region, caused chaos/confusion in their ranks, and set the city up to be easily stormed and controlled.”

IS concludes by noting that keeping Rutba and the surrounding area off-balance prevents a secure Baghdad-Amman travel route, which in turn causes significant material losses for both governments, it prevents Iran and its loyalists in Iraq moving troops over-ground to reinforce the Asad regime in Syria, and it keeps the Trebil crossing dysfunctional, preventing Iraq’s economic normalization with Jordan that would lead to benefits for two states that IS considers enemies.

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Al-Naba 94, released on 17 August 2017, pages 8-9, “The Military Emir of Wilayat al-Raqqa: The Battle of Raqqa Will Not Be a Picnic for Apostates and Crusaders”.

The so-called “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF)—the front for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—launched the offensive against the Islamic State’s Syrian “capital”, Raqqa, on 6 June 2017, supported by U.S. airstrikes. The political problems with using the PKK to occupy Raqqa were obvious ahead of time, became even clearer soon after operations commenced, and were on full display in the final stages of matters, when the PKK made a deal to let hundreds of IS jihadists leave and then raised an enormous banner of PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan in victory over the city on 19 October 2017, two days after the official conclusion of the battle of Raqqa.

Two weeks after the fighting began in Raqqa, Al-Naba 84 implored IS’s fighters to hold out as long as possible to inflict as much damage on the PKK as they could—though as the deal at the end showed, this did not mean fighting until all of IS’s operatives had been killed. To the contrary, Falaha’s speech in May 2016 had prepared IS in public for the transition from statehood to insurgency, and by August 2016, in Al-Naba 43, IS confirmed that it was already engaged in this transition in areas where the rule of its caliphate had given way. In mid-September 2017, Al-Naba 97 explained in some detail how IS’s forces were adapting to the U.S.-led Coalition air campaign using the PKK as ground troops, minimising the jihadist casualties and maximising them among their enemies, and a month later—a few days before Raqqa fell—Al-Naba 101 contained the official declaration that IS’s patchwork transition back to insurgency had become a general policy.

This was the context of the Naba 94 interview with IS’s military emir of Wilayat al-Raqqa, published about halfway through the Raqqa battle—on Day 72 of a 133-day military operation.

Al-Naba 94 introduced the interview by saying, “Anyone who witnessed the battle of Mosul knows for certain that the battle of Raqqa will be nothing but loss and regret for the apostates and their supporters”. It was conceded that there were “raging” battles on the “outskirts” of Raqqa city, but Al-Naba thundered that “the infidels will not advance an inch in the land of Islam” without having to pay for it in blood: Raqqa will be a “cemetery for the apostates and their allies” and “no house will be devoid of the wailing of mourning”.

Speaking about how IS views Raqqa, the Raqqa military emir says the city is somewhat special to IS, in an emotional-political sense, since it was “one of the first cities” they captured. (He does not mention that the jihadists took Raqqa from the rebellion, not the regime. Raqqa was the first provincial capital that fell to the rebels, in March 2013.) The emir goes on: “[Raqqa] was the starting point for the expansion of the Islamic State, and the centre of operations for the caliphate on various fronts”, having a location of “strategic importance” north of the Euphrates, in relation to both Turkey and Syria. The emir says IS’s morale in Raqqa is “high” because, “By the grace of God, [the mujahideen] have two goals; there is no third option. [They will either] meet the Lord of the Worlds, or [achieve] victory (nasr), conquest (fatah), and tamkeen”, which translates literally as “empowerment”, but refers to territorial control, i.e. jihadist governance.

Asked about the aims of “the Crusaders and their agents” in the Raqqa campaign, the IS emir says, “The main objective … is to eliminate Islam and its people, and to separate the people back from their deen (faith) after monotheism (tawhid) was returned to them”, and then lists five other “military objectives” of the U.S.-led Coalition: (1) “Expelling the mujahideen from a vital position in military, economic, and other terms”; (2) Removing IS from one its “largest cities”, believing this will reduce Muslim support for IS; (3) Letting “the atheists” (al-mulahid), i.e. the PKK, to create a “statelet” (duwayla) near the Turkish border on the premise that this will stop jihadists reaching Europe; (4) Taking control of the centre of gravity in northern Syria, including the dams; and (5) Feeding “the delusion of the Crusaders, West and East … [that] seizing Raqqa will be a severe blow to the mujahideen and a lead to the end the caliphate on earth, but they will be disappointed … for it will remain until the Hour of Resurrection”.

The next question, “How did the soldiers of the caliphate and their leaders prepare to defend the Wilayat in general and the city of Raqqa in particular?”, produced the most interesting answer from the IS military emir about the specific tactics the jihadists used in the Raqqa city battle:

The mujahideen spread throughout the Wilayat at the beginning of the campaign to absorb the Crusade: sometimes by playing defense, sometimes by counterattacking …

Ambushes [al-kamayin] in enemy areas and areas where the infidels were expected to enter … had a profound effect on the infidels and the apostates, initiating anxiety [qaliqa] and confusion [or disorder; mudtareeba] in their legions, as the fear rises in their minds and the terror [or horror, dismay; al-ru’b] fills their hearts.

One of the most successful methods for defending against the apostates’ advance is to booby-trap [tafkhikh] the places they are likely to advance [through], especially the strategic ones the enemy wants to use to achieve its imaginary victory [nasr wahmi]. Another method is also the deployment of sniper detachments of various types, whether heavy or light, in strategic locations where the enemy’s vulnerability [the word used is “awra”: lit. “nakedness” or “genitals”] is showing, and on the high ground, such as [the rooves of] buildings and so on.

Car bombs are another method used, targeting gatherings [of enemy personnel] and ordnance that cannot be reached with other weapons, like rocket launchers, etcetera.

The brothers relied on camouflage [al-tamwih]; adopting it was an important reason for whatever success [they have had] in the battle. The brothers also divided the city into sectors and small pieces that were autonomous in case of emergency, able to select their own targets [for attack], as well as having [their own] supplies and ammunition, so that each sector does not need [help from] the other sectors: they [the sectors] are self-sustaining and [able to] act according to their own circumstances …

Workshops were created for the maintenance and repair of weapons, as well as for their manufacture, after the Islamic State—by the grace of God—demonstrated its skill in developing weapons, whether it is aerial weapons, drones, anti-building barricades, sniper rifles, silencers, IEDs, or any other weapon God has bestowed on his mujahideen slaves[.]

Asked about the impact of the Mosul battle on the situation in Raqqa, the IS military emir said: “The brothers in Mosul have had a major impact on the rest of the wilayats of the Islamic State” because their “great steadfastness” and “nikaya” (vexation, damage) against “the idolatrous enemies of God … displayed new methods of fighting that surprised the largest taghuti regimes in the world, despite the fact that these nations [umam] mobilized a very large and militarily advanced force.” The “simple methods” used in Mosul, says the IS emir, have “stunned” the U.S. and its allies, and these tactics and the lessons learned from the experience have been “circulated to all wilayats so they can benefit from them, in faith and militarily.”

The emir concludes his answer about the impact of Mosul with the bombastic statement: “we give good tidings to Muslims all over the world that the battle of Raqqa will not be a picnic for the apostates and their supporters. Rather, it will be a fire that burns the cross and its people, honours the Islamic State and raises its banner, and provides a harsh lesson for the enemies of Islam”.

The final response about the practicalities of the Raqqa battle that the IS emir gave was in answer to a very specific question about thwarting Coalition aerial landings, which he claims have happened in several places, including the Euphrates Dam, where “several” landings of troops have been scuppered by IS ambushes. This is important, the emir says, because the Coalition has made significant use of its overwhelming advantage in air power to try to settle the outcome of its confrontation with the caliphate, and these events showed that this method could not be relied upon.

The final two questions related to messages for the “Crusaders” and “the hypocrites in our ranks who are … wishing for the victory of the infidels over us and wishing to rule by democracy”.

The “Crusaders” (West) are informed by the IS emir that “history has repeatedly recorded the conquests of the Muslims and their destruction of the armies of the cross in their own homes, even when they were at the height of their power”. Large parts of Christendom were tributary states to Islam until quite recently, the emir goes on, and it is God’s promise that Muslims shall rule in the Christian lands again: “God does not break His promises”.

The Muslims who wish for IS’s defeat are urged to “repent” (tubwa) and not to make the mistake of thinking the infidel armies can protect them: “God has guaranteed us victory and promised you defeat”, the IS emir says, and if IS lays hands on these collaborators with the infidels before they have repented, the penalties are—as is well-known—severe. The emir stresses that there is no time-limit on this penalty: IS will keep hunting, “no matter how much you hide among the Muslims … God Almighty will expose you and reveal your evil”.

[There is an echo in this final threat from the Raqqa emir of Falaha’s first speech in August 2011, addressing the Sunnis who had turned on IS: “How long are you going to live in terror? Do any of you believe you can step outside your doors or travel or even sleep in your own homes? When will you enjoy peace again? How long are you going to stay on guard night and day? Do you think we will go away? … Or do you think we will get bored or tired? No!”]

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Al-Naba 100, released on 5 October 2017, page 14, “Military Sawlat: Their Conditions and their Impacts [or Effects or Influence] on the Enemy”.

The article in Al-Naba 100 begins by saying al-sawlat (hit-and-run attacks) are “one of the most important and oldest fighting methods in the world”, then goes on to explain the Islamic State’s version of this guerrilla warfare under various subheadings:

It is a method that attrites [istinzaf] the enemy. It is not used to win wars or to seize territory, but to inflict small, painful, and continuous losses on the enemy … The sawlat are launched by small numbers of attackers, between five and fifteen men, [sometimes] slightly more or less. Those who carry out these types of attacks are characterized by courage and excellent physical fitness. [Sawlat attacks] are not intended only against active fronts and strong defensive fortifications, indeed they will usually choose easier, weak and static targets.

Pillars of Al-Sawlat:

The success of sawlat depends on two things: firstly, the enemy’s surprise, and secondly, the speed in hitting the target and withdrawing. The raids are different from ordinary raids in that they do not require long or costly preparation, which means a small groups of mujahideen can conduct a large number of such attacks in a relatively short time-period.

Types of Sawlat:

There are two types of sawlat performed by the soldiers of the caliphate:

First, sawlat al-mush’a [something like “ground guerrilla operations”], where a small number of mujahideen infiltrate a place near the enemy, strike [the enemy], and then withdraw quickly. Sometimes the strike is by direct and sudden engagement, and sometimes it is by planting a well-camouflaged IED on the enemy’s land supply routes.

The second form of sawlat is using armoured cars to surprise the enemy, attacking them in clashes with heavy machine guns, and then withdrawing quickly.

Where Does Sawlat Work [Best]?

A key factor for the success of sawlat is the length of the line of contact with the enemy: ensure the enemy needs a large number of ribat [border fortification] points against the land of Islam. Prepare using reconnaissance and select the weakest point [along this line]—whether it is weak because of the [small] number of soldiers or armaments, or because of the nature of the terrain, or even because of how easy it is to withdraw from. …

Some military emirs may request more than one mission be carried out at the same time in order to distract the warplanes, but coordination between attacking groups is incompatible with the principle of sawlat: the abundance of sawlat is more important than coordination between them. The goal of neutralizing the warplanes must be reached primarily by the speed of their withdrawal, or—in the worst case [scenario]—by [launching] a simultaneous diversionary attack elsewhere. These [diversion attacks] can be prepared and carried out as needed without much effort, and without affecting the arrival time chosen by the attackers.

It is important for the sawlat to know how long the [enemy] aircraft take to intervene at the place they intend to attack, and to be gone before their arrival.

Enemy Reaction:

The enemy has only limited options in the face of the large number of sawlat, so he must increase the strength of the ribat points by increasing the number of soldiers at each point, as well as increasing the number of ribat points and reducing the distance between them so they can help each other when one comes under attack. Finally, the enemy must increase the soldiers’ abilities to communicate with the warplanes in order [that air power can] help them when the mujahideen attacks occur. This is not at all easy because of the nature of the enemy soldiers, who always fall into confusion [or disarray] when they are attacked, and only a small percentage of the soldiers who are stationed along the line of contact are the ones trained in calling in and directing the airstrikes.

How the Return of the Sawlat Reshape the Battlefield:

The sawlat have a great impact on the internal structure of the enemy’s army because the enemy has to spread out its forces, and over time this front line becomes a merely a hollow crust, with no depth behind this crust to resist when it is broken. This is the case of the Kurdish militias [SDF/PKK] today. It is known that the land behind [their front line] is empty of all military presence, but the unexpected truth is that they have no solution to this problem.

And if we suppose that the enemy’s ability to recruit will increase due to forced conscription [something the PKK is known for], this will also be in the interests of the mujahideen, as compulsory conscripts are not real fighters, but cowards who do not know how to fight, and have no cause to fight for. [This is] especially [true with Arabs conscripted by the PKK] since they are fighting under the banner [raya] of the Kurds, whom they already hate.

Action and Reaction:

The enemy has only one way to deal with the soldiers of the caliphate, which is to flee and summon the warplanes, their God to whom they resort. If they sense the mujahideen approaching, or if shooting [from the jihadists] starts, the only reaction they have trained for us to flee to their rear areas and call in the warplanes. Here, the mujahideen must be satisfied with the losses they have inflicted, and never try to settle in the area [they are attacking]. [The jihadists] especially [must] not stay at the positions from which the enemy has withdrawn. Rather, [the jihadists must] take their spoils and get away from these positions quickly, as these positions are precisely those predetermined for [strikes by] the enemy’s aircraft: as soon as the enemy soldiers withdraw from their positions, the warplanes will come in to strike these positions. This is the most important fighting tactic of the Kurds that they were trained in by the Americans.

Recently, the Nusayri [Asad regime] army has also started using similar schemes. Fortified positions taken from [the regime] are predetermined as targets for artillery. If the mujahideen seize any Nusayri positions, the brothers should be stationed far away from it, because the enemy has scouted these positions in advance and the brothers will not be able to hold off under [the counterattack] of high-intensity fire.

It is important for the mujahid to know the nature of the enemy he is fighting, for the sentry positions occupied by the enemy are generally weak points, because the elite enemy soldiers are the ones who sent [these frontline soldiers forward] in special units. As for the fixed ribat positions along the front line with the Kurds, they are staffed by compulsory conscripts of village people, who have no motivation to fight.

The Effect of Sawlat on the Enemy’s Depth:

The enemy needs to constantly compensate for its losses. Therefore, it is the sawlat on the lines of contact with the enemy that determine where the enemy will concentrate his soldiers, and where he will let his lines weaken, meaning that the active attacker is the one who decides how the enemy’s army will be distributed. This trick [ruse, subterfuge, stratagem: al-heela] always works, with God’s help, and there is no solution for the enemy even when he understands the effects of the sawlat attacks. Either the enemy neglects his remote ribat positions as a result of the constant losses, putting him at risk of being overrun in those areas, or he continues trying to compensate for the losses and weakens the areas that have not been exposed to attacks.

As for the enemy having the ability to recruit to cover every position, this time has passed for the Kurds in particular, and for all the enemies of the caliphate in general, as this war has over-strained [or fatigued; arhaqat] everyone.

Thus, the continuous sawlat will expose any army to collapse, given time, and history has not witnessed any case in which an army has withstood the continuous sawlat. Although the final collapse of the enemy requires a well-prepared ghazwa [invasion, incursion], it is the sawlat that pave the way for the success of any such ghazwa, God willing.

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[The discussion of the sawlat echoes what IS revealed in Al-Naba about IS’s actions in March 2008, just over a year into the surge-and-sahwa, when the organisation was at its nadir: the first emir of “the State”, Hamid al-Zawi (Abu Umar al-Baghdadi), lamented, “We have no place to stand for a quarter of an hour”, and directed his deputy and “war minister”, Abdul Munim al-Badawi (Abu Hamza al-Muhajir), to dismantle all of the IS movement’s conventional forces and fully switch to insurgent operations by small teams of jihadists. There was apparently some internal resistance about this, swiftly overcome when the success of the new strategy became evident.

The sawlat aspect eventually drew the attention of the United States. The August 2019 Inspector General report to Congress recorded the following: “CJTF-OIR [Combined Joint Task Force- Operation INHERENT RESOLVE] said that ISIS refers to its overarching strategy as ‘sahara’ (desert), ‘sahwat’ (a derogatory term for Sunnis who fight against ISIS), and ‘sawlat’ (hit-and-run operations) for its desert-based insurgency. As part of this strategy, CJTF-OIR said that in Iraq, ISIS attempted to expand its influence this quarter [April-June 2019] and carried out attacks in the Sunni-majority provinces where ISIS captured territory in 2014”. CJTF-OIR reported that similar was happening on the Syrian side of the border, in Raqqa, Hasaka, and Deir Ezzor.]

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UPDATES

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In Al-Naba 236, released on 28 May 2020, the main editorial on page 3 was entitled, “[No Turning Your Back on the Believers] Unless it is A Combat Strategy, or [with the Intent of] Retreating to [Join] a Company [of the Believers]”. The phrase is drawn from the Qur’an, Surat al-Anfal (8), chapter 16.

The Naba 236 editorial is a good example of the indistinction within IS between strategy and theology, between as it were the “secular” and the “religious”—categories IS does not recognise. The editorial is an explanation of why guerrilla warfare—that is, hit-and-run attacks that are not designed to capture territory and implement the shari’a—is a legitimate mode of conduct for an organisation that regards itself as a God-ordained state. In brief, the argument is that these attacks prepare the way for governance under the laws of God by wearing down the enemy currently holding the territory. The article comes very close to explicitly endorsing the Maoist view of insurgent warfare that some scholars have detected in IS’s thinking, saying that guerrilla warfare is one phase or stage of the war, which clears the way for a transition to the next phase of territorial administration or statehood. Within this framework, IS casts its practice of force preservation—avoiding open combat with a superior enemy—as not only a necessary feature, but one of which God approves, because He does not unduly burden the believers—there is no expectation from the Almighty of an immediate, all-out war with the infidels when the believers are few and weak. Rather, Al-Naba explains, He would prefer the believers proceed by building up their own manpower, equipment, and wealth, while attriting the disbelievers’ strength: this not only alters the material trendline on the battlefield towards an IS victory; it functions as a form of psychological warfare, inducing despair in the enemy, and thus hastening the day when God’s law reigns supreme. Again, to be able to do this, IS has to preserve its resources to remain capable of waging a relentless guerrilla war, instead of gravely weakening itself by being drawn into an open confrontation when the balance of power is against it.

The editorial is reproduced below:  

The mujahid has the right to use every permissible weapon or method [tareeqa] of fighting to achieve the goal of his jihad, which is defeating his enemy and establishing the deen [faith; often problematically translated as “religion”] of God Almighty in the land in which He gives him tamkeen [lit. “empowerment”, refers to governance of territory], and he strives to choose from [among the methods] that which suits him in each stage of his long jihad.

[Even] if the Islamic State has lost tamkeen in most areas, the establishment of the deen has not stopped, praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds. The mujahideen are still carrying out, in every place that their Mawlahum [Lord or Master] has made obligatory upon them, jihad against al-mushrikeen [the polytheists or idolaters], which is—undoubtedly—one of the highest levels of al-amr bi al-maruf wal-nahee an al-munkar [“enjoining good and forbidding evil”, or “promoting virtue and preventing vice”].

And if fighting on stationary fronts and [using] advancing armies to conquer lands is the appropriate style [or method] of fighting [uslub al-qital] for the tamkeen stage because it offers the possibility of controlling territory and establishing the deen in it, protecting it from being seized by the polytheists and settled with their polytheism and disbelief in God Almighty, then fighting in the style of hit-and-run [al-karara al-farara] guerrillas [al-isabat] is undoubtedly the most appropriate [method] for the mujahideen [to use] in the areas that the polytheists have completely seized and brought under their authority.

The main purpose of fighting in the style of guerrillas is to achieve al-nikaya [the vexation, damage, hurt, or attrition] of the enemies, and this aim is legitimate if it is intended for the sake of God Almighty. God, glory be to Him, has urged this, saying: “Fight them! God will punish them by your hands, humiliate them, and give you victory over them, and He will heal the breasts of the believers” (9 [Al-Tawbah]:14). Al-nikaya is realised by killing, wounding, and capturing them and their families, [and] seizing their wealth or destroying it.

Therefore, the mujahideen guerrillas [should] focus their efforts on inflicting the enemy with the greatest losses in [terms of] lives and money, while taking care to minimise [their own] losses in lives and wealth. Rather, they [the jihadist guerrillas] should work to increase their stocks of these. To the extent that these two conditions are fulfilled—the enemy growing weaker and [the jihadist guerrillas] increasing in strength—nikaya against the enemy should continue, until the right conditions are created for a transition [intiqal] from the guerrilla warfare [harb al-isabat] stage to other necessary stages in achieving tamkeen on the ground.

These blessed guerrillas are not charged when they are first established with holding land, because that is a task beyond their capacity, and nor will they persist [in fighting] when faced with enemies in battles where they do think they have the upper-hand, because the mujahideen in those areas are often few in number, weak in capabilities, and do not have land in which to organise their affairs, and from which they can mobilise their supporters against [the enemy]. [The jihadists here] face an enemy holding land, large in numbers and equipment, and ready to strike at any sign of mujahideen activity, to uproot them and cut their plant before it can grow …

In this situation, [the jihadist guerrillas] do not have to burden themselves beyond their capacity, [they have no need to] hold land for the purpose of tamkeen [when] they are few and weak, and their enemy exceeds them [in numbers] by hundreds or sometimes thousands of times. Their Lord, the mighty and sublime, has permitted [the jihadists] to flee to a place of safety [when they are overmatched] and return to attacking [the enemy] at a time and place in which he can achieve nikaya and gain the upper-hand over him, then they can disappear into hiding again before [the enemy] can mobilise against them and get them. This is the kind of combat strategy the Lord of the Worlds has sanctioned for the believers to enable them to succeed in wars. The Almighty said: “O believers! When you face the disbelievers in battle, never turn your backs to them. If anyone does so on such an occasion—unless it is a combat strategy, or [with the intent of] retreating to [join] a Company [of the believers]—they incur the wrath of God and Hell will be his home, a wretched destination” (Al-Anfal [8]:15-16). [Further theological justifications for this position are then given, quoting the Jami al-Bayan an Ta’wil ay al-Qur’an of Imam al-Tabari (d. 923) and Imam Baghawi’s (d. 1122) Ma’alim al-Tanzil.]

Therefore, the soldiers of the Islamic State should focus their efforts on attrition [istinzaf] of their enemies to the fullest extent at this stage, and not preoccupy themselves with the issue of rushing to achieve tamkeen on earth, as it [tamkeen] is an inevitable result of their jihad—by God Almighty’s permission—that will be achieved for them soon, and the reason for its achievement [will be] what they are doing now, [because of the] fighting and nikaya against the enemies of the deen.

By “attrition” here, we do not mean merely weakening the enemy so as to force him to withdraw from some land so that we can take possession of it and establish tamkeen there: [what] we seek is to bring him to a state in which his bleeding leads to his doom, or exhausting him so much that he can only rise up to fight us again after a long period, during which we have been prepared to push him back and break his shawkatuh [lit. “thorn” or “barb”, the enemy’s ability to harm IS], and [by doing this] his costly war with us [will] sow desperation and despair of victory in his heart and mind, so he sees our victory over him in any possible confrontation as an inescapable reality.

So, increase the raids, O soldiers of the Islamic State, against your enemies. Hit them by surprise, and do not let them obtain from you what they desire, a direct confrontation that works better for them than for you. Preserve your capital—your men and your weapons—and do not take risks with it, so that your profits will continue and increase with the passage of days, with God’s permission. We are [by waging jihad involved] in an act of worship, in which God Almighty has not burdened us beyond our capacity, and has not limited our time. God does not burden a soul beyond its capacity. Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds.

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In December 2009 or January 2010, the then-Islamic State of Iraq wrote an extensive, 55-page document, “A Strategic Plan to Strengthen the Political Situation of the Islamic State of Iraq”, sometimes known as “the Fallujah Memorandum”, in response to the military setback after the U.S. troop “Surge” and tribal “Awakening” (Sahwa). The Strategic Plan focused on methods of insurgency and guerrilla warfare to be used to improve the Islamic State’s military and political position ahead of the planned American withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011 so that the group would be capable of challenging the Iraqi government. An extended summary of the Strategic Plan is available here.