The Unlearned Lesson of 7/7

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 7 July 2022

Read the post over on Substack.

2 thoughts on “The Unlearned Lesson of 7/7

  1. pre-Boomer Marine brat

    Data I found, years ago, backs up your focus on the ISI … however … I also learned that the organization was highly compartmentalized. The T Wing was generally very pro-West and worked easily with the US. The S Wing (aka the Special Service Directorate) was danged-near Islamist, and the fief of the likes of Hamid Gul. It was/is the controlling entity over the Jihadist consortium, including running the November ’08 Mumbai attack from a Karachi control center, communicating by cell phone.

  2. pre-Boomer Marine brat

    Also, before I forget, Sept. 2008 saw the appointment of Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shuja Pasha as the Director of the ISI. He was appointed by COAS Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, with Washington’s approval, as a means of bringing the S Wing under control.

    And it was a senior U.S. defense official of that day who described the ISI as “highly compartmentalized.” It was allegedly so compartmentalized that sections like the S Wing could operate without any sort of knowledge or oversight by superiors.

    This in no way reduces the ISI’s guilt. It does, however, more-tightly focus it.

    Reach into Hamid Gul’s grave and grasp his private parts. Get him to tell you what he knew.


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