By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 16 August 2018
The Taliban released a statement on Tuesday afternoon about its virtual takeover of Ghazni province in southern Afghanistan. Alongside other recent developments, military and political, the outlook for the Coalition mission is increasingly bleak. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 14 August 2018
The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the official name for the Taliban, released a statement a few hours ago on the de facto fall of Ghazni province to its forces. They claimed it was “successful militarily, politically, and socially”, showing the coherence of the Taliban forces an the “disunity, weakness, anxiety, and lack of any local support of the enemy”. This strays into hyperbole, but it is difficult to argue there is no factual basis to it. The statement is reproduced below. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 29 September 2017
The Taliban’s Political Office put out a statement today “concerning opposition to peace process and activities”, which placed blame for the ongoing war in Afghanistan on the Afghan government and the U.S.-led coalition. The statement is reproduced below. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 5 August 2017
Taliban jihadists (image source)
The New York Times reported on the growing closeness of relations between the governments in Iran and Russia, and the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, something that became especially salient earlier this year and which has been visible for at least two years. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 25 April 2017
The evidence is mounting that Vladimir Putin’s government supports the Taliban as a means of thwarting NATO interests in Afghanistan. Russia has long manipulated terrorists, internally and abroad, to suit its policy aims, but as Moscow solidifies its relationship with the Iranian revolution the Russian policy, particularly in Syria, has become something more like a conventional alliance—not least because those who run Tehran’s foreign policy and the clerical regime’s most powerful assets are themselves terrorists. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on September 1, 2015
The Taliban on August 31 finally confessed all: its leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, had been dead since April 23, 2013. The Taliban admitted that Mullah Omar had passed from this veil of tears on July 30 but had been distinctly vague about when. Omar’s death was kept secret because of “jihadi considerations,” namely the “testing” time the mujahideen were having with the “foreign invaders,” the Taliban says. While the Taliban places the emphasis on its struggle with NATO, the reality is that NATO is drawing down and the Taliban’s burgeoning foe is the Islamic State (I.S.). The Taliban is tied to al-Qaeda’s faltering brand, and conditions are militating to help I.S., not al-Qaeda, in “Khorasan”. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on August 26, 2015
Published at National Review
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of the three major insurgent leaders in Afghanistan, a close ally of Iran
The admission by the Taliban on July 30 that its leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar, had died was widely seen as good news for the Islamic State (ISIS) against its jihadist competitors. But while ISIS’s growing power in Afghanistan over the last year has garnered significant attention, the rise of Iran’s influence in the country has been less noted. Worse, in the light of the nuclear agreement with the U.S., Iran’s expanded influence is held by some observers to be a stability-promoting development. This is a dangerous fantasy that has already been falsified in the Fertile Crescent, where the synergetic growth of Iran and ISIS promotes chaos and radicalism—to the advantage of both and the disadvantage of the forces of moderation and order. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on June 29, 2015
Alleged photograph of Mullah Omar. Other photos are very rare
In examining the Saddam Hussein regime’s long relationship with al-Qaeda, a noticeable sub-theme is the connections the Saddam regime had with the Taliban theocracy in Afghanistan. The evidence accumulated suggests that Saddam’s policies in his later years, namely the Islamization of his own regime and instrumentalization of Islamists in foreign policy, included welcoming relations with the Taliban. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on February 10, 2015
This is the fourth of a four-part series looking at the United States’ increasingly-evident de facto alliance with Iran in the region. The first part looked at the way this policy has developed since President Obama took office and how it has been applied in Iraq; the second part looked at the policy’s application in Syria; the third part looked at its application in Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Yemen; and this part is a conclusion. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on November 22, 2014
Since President Obama’s 2009 announcement of a ‘surge’ in Afghanistan that simultaneously announced the date of withdrawal, the western focus in Afghanistan has shifted to the exits.
The steady drizzle of bad news since then has reinforced this sense that it’s over, we’ve had enough and we’re leaving.
American and British troops quit Helmand in late October, basically ceding it to Taliban control. On Tuesday John Sopko, the head of the American auditor mechanism (SIGAR) said that efforts to promote economic growth in Afghanistan have ‘accomplished nothing.’ Continue reading
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