By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 29 August 2018
Two ideas that have become quite prevalent are that the Islamic State is defeated or on its way to defeat and that the Syrian war is winding down. Both are gravely mistaken. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 26 May 2018
Ahmad bin Sa’id al-Amudi (Abu Karam al-Hadrami) // Picture from page 9 of Al-Naba 133 (25 May 2018)
The 133rd edition of the Islamic State’s (IS) weekly newsletter, Al-Naba, was released on 25 May 2018. In Al-Naba, on page nine, there was a profile of Ahmad bin Sa’id al-Amudi (Abu Karam al-Hadrami), a Saudi jihadist who fought for IS and was killed in Yemen. Al-Naba has run obituaries for prominent IS operatives like Mohammed Emwazi (Abu Muharib al-Muhajir), often known as “Jihadi John”, very senior IS officials whose biographies were shrouded in mystery like Abd al-Rahman al-Qaduli (Abu Ali al-Anbari) and Ali Aswad al-Jiburi (Abu Ayman al-Iraqi), as well as completely unknown figures like Abu Sulayman al-Libi. Al-Amudi is in this final category. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 25 May 2018
Al-Naba 132
The Islamic State released the 132nd edition of Al-Naba, its newsletter, on 18 May. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 23 May 2018
Said Afandi al-Chirkawi (image source)
The Islamic State (IS) laid claim, in two recent issues of its newsletter, Al-Naba, to three recent attacks in Russia. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 6 May 2018
Al-Naba 130, page 3
The 130th edition of Al-Naba, the Islamic State’s (IS) newsletter, was published on 4 May 2018. On page 3, there was an article about IS’s position on democracy, which is reproduced below. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 4 May 2018
Devastation in Yarmuk refugee camp for Palestinians in Syria, 28 April 2018 (image credit: Omar Sanadiki, Reuters)
The 130th edition of Al-Naba, the Islamic State’s (IS) newsletter, was published on 4 May 2018. The main story on the first page was, “For the Second Week, Soldiers of the Caliphate in Southern Damascus Inflict Heavy Losses on the Nusayri Army”, and this continued on page 4.
Nusayri refers to the Alawi sect from which Syrian ruler Bashar al-Asad hails and is part of IS’s sectarian framing of its war. The story covers the fighting between the pro-Asad forces[1] and IS in the southern areas of the Syrian capital around al-Qadam, al-Hajar al-Aswad, Tadamun, and the Yarmuk Camp for Palestinian refugees.
For the Asad regime, this battle is the culmination of its consistent strategy, which it has on several occasions spelled out, to eliminate all opposition that is acceptable to local populations and the international community so that it can draw on their support, passive and active, in its war against the insurgency. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 28 April 2018
Al-Naba 129, page 3
The 129th issue of Al-Naba, the Islamic State’s newsletter, contained an article on page 3 that made takfir (excommunication) against Tandheem Hurras al-Deen (The Organization for the Guardians of the Religion or the Religious Guardians’ Organization), al-Qaeda’s new, if unofficial, branch in Syria. A rough translation of the article is reproduced below. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 26 April 2018
A-Naba 125
The Islamic State (IS) formally turned from statehood to insurgency last October. The 125th edition of Al-Naba, IS’s weekly newsletter, released on 29 March 2018, contained a number of indicators that the jihadists’ guerrilla warfare is gaining considerable steam—and that IS thinks it should gain more. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 21 April 2018
Al-Naba 128, page 11
The 128th edition of Al-Naba, the Islamic State’s (IS) weekly newsletter, released on 20 April, contained in its concluding, “Events of the Week” section, the organisation’s reaction to the 14 April military strikes by America, Britain, and France against the Bashar al-Asad regime for its use of poison gas in Duma. This short comment is reproduced below. Continue reading
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 20 April 2018
Since the uprising in Syria began in 2011, Bashar al-Asad’s regime has followed a tried and trusted script to destroy the opposition by eliminating all engageable elements, creating a binary choice for the population and the world—the despotism or a terrorist takeover.
Asad bolstered extremists within the insurgency: letting Islamists out of prison while imprisoning secular activists, pushing a peaceful protest movement into violence, heightening sectarian tensions, and financial schemes of various kinds. Asad then then left IS alone for a year to build its caliphate, while obliterating rebel-held areas that could provide an attractive alternative to the dictatorship. Continue reading
Kyle Orton's Blog 