Tag Archives: jihadism

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham Gives Its Version of Its Own History and Ties to Al-Qaeda

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 5 December 2017

Abdurraheem Atun

Abd al-Rahim Atun (Abu Abdallah al-Shami), the leading cleric of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), released a statement on 29 November 2017, dated 13 October 2017, laying out the history of HTS, its evolution from Jabhat al-Nusra to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham to HTS, and its relationship with al-Qaeda. Atun’s statement was a response to a speech a day earlier by al-Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, which said that HTS remained bound to him and al-Qaeda through a bay’a (oath of allegiance) and HTS’s attempts to get out of this were un-lawful manipulations of the kind used by the Islamic State. Atun’s statement was translated by Al-Maqalaat and an edited version is posted below. Continue reading

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham Announces a Ceasefire With Syrian Rebels, Forms a “Settlement Committee”

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 4 December 2017

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian jihadi group previously under al-Qaeda’s command structure, which has recently arrested some al-Qaeda loyalists in Syria, has been engaged in assaults on the Syrian rebellion for many years in an effort to assert its own hegemony. On 2 December, HTS declared a ceasefire with all other insurgent units and the formation of a Settlement Committee or Reconciliation Committee. Though HTS claims this Committee is independent, it is quite clearly within HTS’s shari’a department. The Committee issued its first statement on the same day it was announced, a translation of which was made by Al-Maqalaat, and is republished below. Continue reading

Ayman al-Zawahiri Finally Addresses the Problems with Al-Qaeda’s Syrian Branch

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 4 December 2017

The leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, gave a thirty-five-minute speech on 28 November 2017, entitled: “Let Us Fight Them As A Solid Structure” (or “Let Us Fight Them As One Body” or “Let Us Fight Them With Solid Foundations”), dealing with the vexed question of al-Qaeda’s relationship with the Syrian jihadi group, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, a situation that escalated again in recent days. The mention of an impending Turkish intervention into Idlib—which began on 7 October—suggests that al-Zawahiri recorded this speech in the last days of September or the first few days of October. An English transcript of the speech was released by As-Sahab Media, and is reproduced below with some edits for syntax and transliteration. Continue reading

Islamic State Profiles a Libyan Jihadist Killed in Eastern Syria

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 4 December 2017

Al-Naba 108, page 7

The latest edition of the Islamic State’s newsletter, Al-Naba 108, released on 1 December 2017, has a profile on page 7 of a fighter named Abu Sulayman al-Libi, a Libyan jihadist who came to Syria soon after the caliphate declaration in June 2014 and became the senior religious official in Homs. Abu Sulayman was killed in the fighting between IS and the pro-Asad coalition in the deserts of eastern Homs Province, near the T3 oil pumping station. This probably means Abu Sulayman was killed in the last days of September or the first few days of October during the IS counter-attack to the regime coalition’s push into Deir Ezzor. A rough translation of the Naba obituary is published below. Continue reading

The Islamic State Urges Caution About Beliefs in the Apocalypse

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 2 December 2017

Al-Naba 107, page 8, 27 November 2017

The 107th edition of Al-Naba, the Islamic State’s newsletter, was released on 27 November 2017. On page 8 there was an article that cautioned against applying apocalyptic prophecies to the present day. A very rough translation is produced below. Continue reading

The Islamic State’s Minister of War Criticises Regional Religious Leaders For Not Supporting The Jihad in Iraq

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 24 November 2017

Abdul Munim al-Badawi (Abu Hamza al-Muhajir), the “war minister” of the Islamic State of Iraq, the predecessor to ISIS, made a brief five-minute speech on 30 April 2007, entitled “Nada ila Ulema al-Umma” (نِدَاءٌ إِلَى عُلَمَاءِ الأُمَّةِ). “Ulema” refers to Islamic scholars, sometimes translated as “clerics”, a slightly misleading comparison with Christianity, and “umma” refers to the worldwide community of Muslims, so the title of the speech translates as, “An Appeal to the Community’s Scholars”. Al-Badawi’s basic point—made at a time when the Islamic State movement was beginning to suffer under the pressure of the Surge and Sahwa—was to condemn the regional ulema for not supporting, and not having supported, the jihadists in Iraq against the Americans and the Shi’is. Implicitly, Al-Badawi is criticising the ulema for holding back Muslims in regional States who might otherwise have joined the Iraqi jihad as foreign fighters and suicide bombers, potentially making a difference to the Islamic State’s military fortunes. A rough translation of the speech is reproduced below.

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The Controversial End of the Islamic State in Raqqa

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 14 November 2017

IS jihadists arriving south of Deir Ezzor city, September 2017

A deal was made between the “Syrian Democratic Forces,” the U.S.-led Coalition’s “partner force” in Syria that is wholly dominated by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the Islamic State (IS), which ostensibly evacuated the remnants of the IS jihadists—said to be between 300 and 500 militants, plus 400 “hostages” (i.e. women and children)—from Raqqa by 15 October. The U.S.-led Coalition said at the time, “do not condone” the deal, but the Coalition acknowledged that its PKK partner had to make these tactical calls, and there was a lot of local pressure from local tribal leaders to reach this deal given the devastation visited on the city. It now transpires, however, that this deal was the worst of all worlds: the Coalition ruined the city in its efforts to overcome IS’s tactical adaptations to the air campaign, and then allowed a scandalous number of IS jihadists to escape. Continue reading

The Third Deputy of the Islamic State: Muhammad Khalaf Shakar

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 12 November 2017

Muhammad Shakar had, according to his martyr biography, “become influenced by Salafism in 1997-98 while serving as a part of [Saddam] Hussein’s Special Republican Guard”.[1] Quitting the military and returning to his home in Mosul, Shakar was harassed by the regime until he went to join Ansar al-Islam in the mountains of Kurdistan.[2]

Shakar, known as Abu Talha al-Ansari or Abu Talha al-Mawsuli, joined the predecessor to Islamic State either just before or just after Saddam fell, and he was arrested in Mosul on 14 June 2005. Continue reading

Islamic State and Female Fighters

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 8 November 2017

The Khansaa Brigade, the all-female Islamic State espionage network and morality enforcement police, based in Raqqa city (image source)

A debate has been ongoing among analysts since the summer about the view the Islamic State (IS) has of mujahidat (female fighters). IS now seems to have settled the matter in its newsletter, Al-Naba. Continue reading

The Islamic State Claims the Manhattan Terror Attack

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 3 November 2017

The Islamic State’s claim for the 31 Oct. 2017 Manhattan terror attack is on the right. (Al-Naba 140, 2 Nov. 2017, page 3.)

The Islamic State released the 140th edition of its newsletter, Al-Naba, on 2 November 2017, which contained an article claiming that the perpetrator of the vehicular ramming terrorist attack in New York city on Halloween night, Sayfullo Saipov, an Uzbek immigrant to the United States, was one of the caliphate’s “soldiers”. The Islamic State also repeated its much-contested claim that Stephen Paddock, whom it refers to as “Abu Abd al-Bir al-Amriki”, was motivated by its call when carrying out the massacre at the concert in Las Vegas on 1 October. The article is reproduced below.
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